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The effects of heavy case loads upon the operations of
criminal courts in Illinois, as well as in almost every other
state in the nation, have been the subject of much concern
for over fifty years. Indeed, much of the existing empirically
oriented,research on criminal courts attempts to outline
the effects of case load pressure upon various aspects
of court operations'. Criminal court practitioners (judges,
prosecutors, public defenders, and other courtroom per-
sonnel) are usually portrayed as overworked officials
adapting to adverse conditions and doing the best they
can to administer criminal justice fairly and efficiently.
As pervasive as the notion of case load pressure has been,
however, the effects of variations in this pressure on the
operations of criminal courts have not been examined
rigorously and systematically Coupled with this situation
are recent challenges to traditional views on criminal courts.
Many contemporary criminal justice researchers question
the relationship between case load pressure and criminal
court malfunctioning, as well as the utility of resolving
criminal court problems by simply increasing court man-
power. In their view, case loads provide a convenient
explanation — a "nonreactive cause" — for. what takes
place in criminal courts. That is, unlike judges or prose-
cutors, case loads cannot respond to accusations.
Here, elements of this controversy are addressed. First,
a brief overview of the historical development of the case
load controversy is given, with particular emphasis upon
Illinois and Cook County. Then, the results of a limited
empirical examination of the effect of variations in case
load pressure upon the operations of Cook County felony
trial courts are reported. These results show that variations
in case loads have no impact upon some of the most im-
portant aspects of trial court operations. An explanation
for these findings is presented which focuses upon several
unique institutional features of criminal courts. Some em-
pirical evidence is also offered for this view of trial
courts. Finally, implications of these analyses for court
reform are considered.
Historical Perspective
The first serious examination of criminal courts in Illinois
was the Illinois Crime Survey, first published in 1929 by
the Illinois Association for Criminal Justice. The major
focus of the case load problem as discussed in this work
was on Cook County courts. In the county system at that
time, trial court cases often took over three months to
complete; only 19 7 percent of all defendants initially
charged with felonies were convicted. Over 81 percent
of these convictions were the result of guilty pleas. Of
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those convicted, 21 percent were given probation, while
another 25 percent were given sentences of less than one
year in confinement. To the crime survey researchers, these
figures indicated gross inefficiency and massive malfunc-
tioning in the criminal court system — due, at least in part,
to the volume of cases it processed. In 1928, trial court
judges handled an average case load of 750. The re-
searchers argued that this work load was far too high to
process cases effectively. Many potentially culpable de-
fendants had their cases dismissed by prosecutors be-
cause of insufficient resources. In addition, case load
pressures forced judges and prosecutors into plea bar-
gaining with defendants. This, it was argued, accounted
for the high guilty plea rates and relatively light sentences.
The Illinois Crime Survey was just one of many such
studies conducted during the 1920s. Most reported simi-
lar results and advocated similar reforms, prominent
among them proposals to increase criminal justice re-
sources to combat the case load problem. Since these
ground-breaking crime surveys, other studies have
reached similar conclusions. Their major contentions
were aptly summarized in the 1968 report of the Presi-
dent's Commission on Law Enforcement. It stated: "The
final and most serious problem of urban and suburban
courts is the enormous volume of the crime and delin-
quency cases that come before them. . . . Partly in order
to deal with volume, many courts have routinely adopted
informal, invisible, administrative procedures for han-
dling offenders." The commission, along with most other
contemporary students of criminal courts, advocated large
increases in criminal court resources to combat the prob-
lems attributed to volume.
More recently, similar conclusions were drawn by the
Chicago Bar Association in its 1975 Program for Action.
A study of the criminal justice system in Cook County
led the association to advocate major reforms. It found that
because case loads were high, trial preparation by
prosecutors and public defenders was hasty and in-
adequate. Moreover, while some guilty defendants went
free when delay discouraged witnesses, other defendants
remained incarcerated for many months, only to be found
not guilty at trial. In short, the system was ineffective,
inefficient, and undignified. These observations were
followed by recommendations that the number of judges,
bailiffs, clerks, prosecutors, public defenders, and pro-
bation officers be increased sharply.
As is evident, the bar association's proposals and the
state legislature's actions are clearly within the mainstream
of traditional thought on criminal justice reform. It must
be recognized, however, that while traditionally much
reliance has been placed upon increases in court resources
to reduce plea bargaining and dismissal rates, the effect
of increased resources upon courtroom operations has
never been documented. In fact, there is scattered evidence
which indicates that significant increases in resources
have little influence upon courtroom operations. If the
Illinois Crime Survey data and those of crime surveys in
other states are examined, it is clear that, as far back as
the 1920s, dismissal rates, guilty plea rates, and court
delays have been similar in urban and rural jurisdictions —
despite vastly different case load problems. One study
showed that in Connecticut, trial rates (the proportion
of cases disposed of by trial) of about 10 percent have
been relatively constant since the late 1880s.
More recently, it has been demonstrated that dramatic
changes in the ratio of manpower to case load have not
had much impact upon the dispositional process. In
Connecticut, for example, a 1971 change in jurisdiction
laws almost halved the case load in some superior courts.
Even though there was no reduction in manpower in
these courts, neither was there an appreciable increase
in the trial rate.
Cook County Felony Case Loads
One important aspect of the case load controversy is the
effect of case load levels upon guilty plea rates, dismissal
rates, and sentences in guilty plea cases. A sample of
81 6 felony cases disposed of during 1972-73 in the Criminal
Division of the Cook County Circuit Court was examined in
this light. During this period the size of judges' monthly
dockets varied a good deal. These cases were analyzed
to determine whether they were processed differently
in months when dockets were light from months when
dockets were heavy. From January 1972 to June 1973
judges' monthly dockets varied from a low of 109 to a high
of 559 cases, with a mean of 283 cases. To simplify the
analysis, months in which cases were disposed of during
this time were categorized according to whether individual
judges' dockets were high, medium, or low. The criteria
used in this categorization are reported in Table 1, which
also shows the number of cases disposed of in each of
the three categories.
Since there was a good deal of variation in case load
pressure during the time when the sample of felony cases
was taken, one would expect markedly different court
outputs in each of the three periods. If the expectations
of traditional researchers are correct, dismissal rates and
guilty plea rates will be higher in months when case
loads are high than in months when they are low. When
case loads are low, it would be expected that prosecutors
and judges would be under less pressure to secure guilty
pleas and more able to pursue cases to trial. Sentences in
guilty plea cases during months with low case loads are
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Table 1
JUDGE CASE LOAD AT DISPOSITION
January 1972-June 1973
Range
of Case Loads
Number of
Cases in Sample
Cumulative
Frequency
Low
Medium
High
109-239
242-313
314-559
200
198
200
334
66 6
100
expected to be higher than sentences during months with
high case loads; presumably, judges and prosecutors
have stronger bargaining positions when case loads are
lower.
It should be noted that meaningful results cannot be
arrived at by a simple comparison of guilty plea rates,
dismissal rates, and sentences at different levels of
case loads. Many factors other than case load pressure
affect the criminal process. The seriousness of the offense,
the weight of the evidence gathered, the predispositions
of the judge, the type of defense counsel, relevant charac-
teristics of the defendant, and many other factors influence
the outcome of a case, and they must be taken into account.
By statistical manipulation through multiple regression
analysis, extraneous factors can be controlled while
analyzing a given factor of prime interest. In this study,
multiple regression was used to assess the impact of
case load upon case outcomes while controlling for such
extraneous factors as case seriousness, weight of the
evidence, and type of defense counsel. What will be re-
ported is the impact of variations in case load pressure
upon a typical armed robbery case involving a typical
defendant and handled by a typical defense counsel,
prosecutor, and judge. It should be emphasized that while
guilty plea rates, sentences, and dismissal rates would be
different if another type of offense were used, the dif-
ferences attributable to variations in case loads would
not vary.
1
The results of the regression analyses are shown in
Table 2. With extraneous factors controlled, the effects
of different levels of case load pressure upon case outcomes
were found to be negligible and statistically insignificant
(that is, the observed differences were so small that
they could be solely due to chance). Consider the first
row of numbers, which reports, for high, medium, and low
levels of case load pressure, the probability of a typical
Table 2
IMPACT OF CASE LOAD PRESSURE
ON PREDICTED OUTCOME
OF A TYPICAL ARMED ROBBERY CASE
Case Load Pressure
Low Medium
Predicted proportion of guilty pleas 74% 72%
Predicted proportion of dismissals 18% 18%
Predicted sentence after a guilty
plea (months) 55.7 58.5
High
70%
18%
61.2
armed robbery case's resulting in a guilty plea. These
probabilities, expressed as proportions, may be viewed
1 For a detailed discussion of factors affecting the disposition of cases
in Chicago felony courts, see Peter F. Nardulli. The Courtroom Elite:
An
Organizational Perspective (Cambridge. Mass.: Ballinger, forthcoming
1978)
as roughly corresponding to the average guilty plea rates
for typical armed robbery cases in each of the three
categories. As evident from the figures, differences in
these average rates are minimal. Even these slight
differences are not in the expected direction — guilty
plea rates are marginally higher when case load pressure
is low than when it is high.
The figures reported in the second row of Table 2 are
the predicted probabilities of a typical armed robbery
case's being dismissed in each of the three categories.
There are no differences at all in these figures, again
contrary to what traditional criminal justice researchers
would expect. Finally, the third row of the table reports
predicted sentences for a typical armed robbery case.
Here again the predicted differences are contrary to what
traditional researchers would predict, and these differences
are too small to be statistically or substantively significant.
The results reported here indicate that, as shown by
other recent studies, differences in case loads do not
appear to affect case outcomes to any major degree.
Cases disposed of during months when case loads are
low are apparently disposed of in the same manner as
in months when case loads are high.
Levels of Operation
One explanation for these findings has to do with utilization
of court resources. Traditional researchers assumed that
criminal courts were operating at or beyond capacity
levels. Given such overutilization, it is logical that increases
in case loads would affect case outcomes. Despite the
constant cries of overburdened officials, even the most
casual observer in the Cook County felony trials courts in
1972-73 would have noted much idle time. Indeed, a
Chicago Sun-Times study published in 1973 estimated
that a criminal court judge in Cook County spends an
average of only two-and-three-quarters hours a day on
the bench. During the time of this study, judges worked
somewhere between three and five hours per day. Such
a situation is not unique to Cook County. Studies in Con-
necticut and elsewhere have indicated that some judges
spend as little as one to three hours on the bench each
day.
Courts as Organizations
The observation that, as elsewhere, there is considerable
excess capacity in the Cook County criminal court system
leads to a second important point. Almost 60 percent of
all trial court cases in Cook County result in guilty pleas,
and these pleas account for 80 percent of all convictions.
If plea bargaining and other less publicized, informal,
"administrative" procedures are largely due to case load
pressure, why are they so pervasive in times of excess
capacity? The answer to this question can be found in a
new and different way of looking at criminal courts.
Many contemporary scholars are beginning to view criminal
court operations in much the same manner as they view
the operations of any organization; criminal courts are
perceived to handle their case loads much as a welfare
agency or health clinic handles its work. Of course, as
organizations go, the "court organization" has several
unique aspects, which help to explain why administrative
shortcuts exist in periods of excess capacity.
Most of the court organization's work is performed by
two sets of work groups (courtrooms) — preliminary hearing
courts and trial courts. In each work group, cases are pro-
cessed by a set of criminal justice officials — a judge, a
prosecutor, and a public defender or private defense
counsel — who, working together over an extended period
of time, develop close ties and common understandings.
Unlike most organizations, where power and discretion
are vested in the upper levels of a hierarchy, in the court
organization, power and discretion are vested in the work
groups. The judge, the prosecutor, and the defense counsel
control virtually every important aspect of a case's disposi-
tion: The prosecutor initiates charges and has the power
to drop or amend them, as well as the power to recommend
sentences. The judge also has the power to dismiss
charges. In addition, he is responsible for ruling on motions,
for passing sentence on convicted defendants, and, often,
for determining guilt or innocence. Among other powers,
the defense counsel can raise and argue legal motions
and appeal adverse rulings.
Besides their almost monopolistic power, courtroom
work groups have another important characteristic vital
to understanding why administrative shortcuts exist
during periods of excess capacity. That is, it is in the self-
interest of those who control the dispositional process —
the judge, the prosecutor, and the defense counsel -
to handle their cases expeditiously. A defense counsel
generally is paid the same whether a case goes to trial,
is dismissed, or a guilty plea negotiated. Generally low
fees in criminal cases make it imperative that these at-
torneys turn over large numbers of cases with minimal
expenditure of resources. Most private attorneys could
probably not afford to provide every client with a truly
adversary defense.
Similarly, judges, prosecutors, and public defenders
are interested in expeditious dispositions. Each day they
have a set number of cases to handle. The less time they
devote to each, the sooner they will be able to complete
the daily call. Hence, except for very serious or highly
publicized cases, these officials have a built-in incentive
to handle cases quickly and informally; this incentive
exists whether there are two or two hundred cases on
the daily docket. This personal incentive to expeditiously
handle cases is reinforced by the view, widely held by
most criminal justice practitioners, that most defendants
in the trial courts are factually guilty of something. In
their view, the question posed by most cases is not, did
the defendant do it, but, what do we do with the case
now that we have it?
To summarize, if one regards courts as organizations,
the existence of informal administrative procedures, such
as plea bargaining, during times of excess capacity can
be explained by the nature of criminal court work groups
and participants' perceptions of their clients. It is in the
interest of the judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel
to informally dispose of most cases and, because they
have the power to realize these ends, expeditious methods
are dominant even during slack periods.
This explanation, however, raises a variety of questions.
If in fact criminal courts do operate like organizations,
then changes in case loads cannot be irrelevant to court
operation. In order to exist over an extended period of
time, an organization of any type must be responsive to
its environment. General Motors, for example, must respond
to changes in demand if it is to remain competitive. Like-
wise, the court organization cannot be indifferent to the
public, and changes in case loads are a loose indicator
of demand for services by the public. Increased case
loads are evidence of either increased crime or increased
public propensity to report crime. Thus, if the criminal
court system operates like other organizations, it would
be expected to respond to demands for increased services
by increasing its output. This is especially true if, as has
been alleged here, the court system can accommodate
more cases than it does presently
Response to External Demands
To analyze whether the court organization responds to
external demands for increased services by increasing
its output, the average number of indictments each judge
disposed of during 1972-73 was examined for each of
the three categories of the two case load variables. Regres-
sion analysis again was used, this time to determine the
number of indictments in a given month that a judge would
be expected to dispose of in each of the three case load
categories (high, medium, and low). For high case loads,
thirty-one indictments were disposed of during the month;
for medium, twenty-eight; and for low, twenty-three. These
differences were in the expected direction (the greater
the case load, the greater the number of indictments dis-
posed of), and they were statistically significant. For ex-
ample, the predicted number of indictments disposed of
by a judge in a month when case loads were considered
high was almost 50 percent greater than the number in
a month when case loads were considered low. Thus,
while guilty plea rates, dismissal rates, and sentencing
structures were not affected by changes in case loads, as
most traditional researchers had thought, those who
control the dispositional process do seem to respond to
perceived external demands for increased services by
giving the public "more of the same."
Policy Implications
The policy implications embodied in traditional criminal
justice research were quite straightforward. To alleviate
such problems as plea bargaining, high dismissal rates,
and lenient sentences, criminal court resources must be
increased. Experience in Cook County and elsewhere,
however, shows that the problems plaguing the American
criminal court system are not so simple, nor are their
solutions.
The analysis undertaken here has no straightforward
policy implications, but it does suggest areas where
changes might be fruitful. First, the fundamental problem
facing criminal courts may be simply one version, albeit
unique, of the classical bureaucratic problem. That is,
a small cadre of individuals — charged with the respon-
sibility for performing a given task, vested with the power to
perform it, and subjected to few external constraints —
has utilized the resources under its control for its own self-
interest. Increasing the resources of such a system merely
makes the pursuit of this self-interest easier. This is not
to say, however, that additional resources will not be
needed to bring about a truly adversary criminal justice
system. Before such resources will produce favorable
results, however, fundamental changes in the power struc-
ture within courtroom work groups should be made. More
specifically, power needs to be decentralized, and ad-
versary relations among the participants need to be insti-
tutionalized
Although these goals seem very abstract, several steps
could be taken to achieve them. First, charging, dismissal,
and sentencing powers could be stripped from the court-
room work groups An independent charging board could
be set up to evaluate cases referred by the police. The
board could refuse to initiate charges in some cases,
utilize diversionary programs in other cases, and send
others into the felony court system. Cases sent to the
court system would then be assigned to a criminal court.
The sole function of these courts would be to decide the
guilt or innocence of the defendant. If guilt were determined,
the case would be sent to an independent sentencing board
which would then impose sentence in accordance with
set, though flexible, criteria. Such a process would virtually
eliminate plea bargaining and many of the sentencing
disparities which result from the bargaining process and
the propensities of the participants. To ensure that the
determination of guilt or innocence is made in an adversary
context, an incentive system could be introduced in-
volving financial inducements to prosecutors and defense
counsels for their successful handling of a case.
These ideas are, of course, merely rough suggestions
for improving the criminal court process. Many problems
would need to be worked out and refinements introduced
before they could be implemented. Also, their use would
require the addition of a significant number of resources.
Although these are only tentative suggestions, they have
been developed after five years of observation and analysis
of the criminal court system in Cook County and elsewhere.
During the period of this study it has become very apparent
that the greatest impediments to change in the system
are the vested interest which criminal court participants
have in the present structure and their power to resist
external interference. Nothing less than a fundamental
restructuring of the power and interest structure within
criminal courts will bring about a criminal justice system
approximating the ideal embodied in Anglo-American
notions of due process.
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